-5-because of the labor demographics of an aging population, changes in the labor and work force, more open search-and-matching in the labor market and frictions in labor supply responses, this essential dimension and source of measurement for the business cycle may have been altered.
The labor market data used in measuring the business cycle and its turning points may now be out-of-synch with other data, such as output, on the business cycle than previously.
The global nature of business cycles is far different because of the immense changes in
global economic geography that have taken place, especially in recent years-ranging across demands and supplies in non-U.S. economies and global regions, cross-border investments, trade flows, financing and production, some countries that used to be Emerging now Developed, e.g., China, and for those still Developing or Emerging countries increased openness for more of them, reductions in trade propensities with the United States but increases globaregionally, and a greater mobility of resources across countries, especially for labor and technology.
Consider the present interrelated global economies and financial markets, central banks operating more-or-less independently in most countries, widespread and developed capital markets, more mobile movements of labor, capital, and funds flows across portfolios around-theworld, the ability to produce and distribute from almost anywhere, generally flexible exchange rates, increased trade flows except during recessions, and the huge volume of transactions in finance and information technology that surround economic activity. And, given new near instantaneous transmission of information in financial markets and the economy with modern telecommunications, computer networks, personal digital assistants and speeded-up decisionmaking, it is hard to think that the underlying dynamics of the U.S. business cycle would not be affected, especially where transactions-based economic activity is involved. different than back in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In 1960 , the corresponding proportions were 37. 6% and 16.3%, respectively. Between 2008:3 and 2009 :2 changes of inventories plummeted, from a rate of -$29.7 billion to -$160 billion, a huge downcycle. With capital goods expenditures concentrated in short-lived equipment, particularly Information Processing and Software, and inventories fungible, an easy substitutability of capital and inventories exists for now very costly labor and so can easily be taken down. Nonresidential business fixed investment fell a huge 19.5%, 39.2% and 9.6%, at annual rates, from 2008:4 to 2009:2. Equipment spending fell 25.9%, 36.4% and 4.9%, at annual rates, over the same time span. There also is the element of psychology in economic behavior and the role of expectations in business cycles, particularly in financial markets and asset pricing and in the transmission to spending, directly and through effects on balance sheets, little explored but clearly present especially in the latest downturn. Shifts of consumer sentiment, in business expectations, "disappointment" in expectations or in actual versus what was expected, financial market prices, the "herd-like" behavior of participants in financial markets as manifested in a flight-to-safety, and huge shifts in liquidity preference are evidence. Expectations have long been part of macroeconomic dynamics, but are especially important for financial markets and the financial transmission mechanism to the real economy.
In the formation of macroeconomic policy, expectations also play an important role since monetary and fiscal policies react to information on certain variables, often expectations of the variables, e.g., inflation (monetary policy) or the unemployment rate and joblessness (fiscal and monetary policy). Survey and anecdotal data, ample these days, would provide information that might be relevant for measuring the business cycle.
With this backdrop as context, this paper asks and attempts to answer, or simply to leave for further research, some possibly provocative questions about the business cycle in its modern setting and to present some evidence on some changes in a changing U.S. economy, potentially -7-relevant for the conceptualization, measurement, and dating of the business cycle. It seeks to motivate a revisiting and rethinking of the business cycle in light of the changed economy and methods of analysis and measurement meant for another age, for another time, perhaps essentially another world.
Would a rethinking and revisiting of the business cycle in the context of modern and tightly interwoven financial and real economic phenomena lead to a different conceptualization for its phases? Does a changed structure in the production of, and spending on, goods and services suggest different measures for measurement and dating? Are different indicators for measurement and perhaps even for the depth and duration of the business cycle called for rather than those, such as real GDP, that as an average summary measure may be less informative and timely than previously? Are there better ways to approach the measurement and dating of turning points? Might some of the conclusions drawn about business cycles, ranging from the "Great Moderation" to the information content of real GDP about "the economy" and its use for the timing and content of stabilization policies, be altered?
Why should we care about these questions? One answer is a better understanding of the business cycle. Another is better prediction of the business cycle and its risks for policy and planning. Finally, conceptualizing, measuring, and dating the business cycle in light of the changing U.S. economy could well have policy implications of considerable import, such as the timing and content of macroeconomic policies insofar as business cycle stabilization is concerned. Perhaps most important is whether rethinking and revisiting the business cycle will help in devising and implementing macroeconomic policies that can achieve the goals of maximum sustainable growth and price level stability with as few destabilizing excesses and imbalances in the economy and financial system as possible.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II looks at some features and changes in the economy that invite questions of conceptualization, measurement, and dating. There are five -8-of them; Sections IIA-IIE. This Section discusses the features of the economy that invite and can perhaps motivate a rethinking of how the business cycle is depicted, measured, and dated in the modern era. Section III provides some concluding perspectives on what is most clear and what is not in terms of revisiting and rethinking the business cycle.
II. Changes in a Changing Economy and the Business Cycle
What are some major changes in the economy that might invite a rethinking and revisiting of the business cycle? Has the business cycle changed?
6 Perhaps a more relevant way of putting it is whether the economy has changed and therefore the ways in which the business cycle should be depicted, measured, and dated be changed.
Five "changes" are discussed-1) the "Financial Factor" in the Business Cycle; 2) a "Goods"
or "Services" Economy; 3) the Labor Market; 4) Globalization; and 5) Psychology and Expectations.
(1) and (5), in some form, have always been present but not fully recognized. 
A. The Financial Factor in the Business Cycle
Financial phenomena in the business cycle, no matter in what form, always seem to have been present and decisive, both in the upturns and downturns.
7
The financial factor can be illustrated by the behavior of financial markets, asset prices, household wealth, and consumption in the latest downturn. This is only one dimension of the ways that the financial factor was integral to the last business cycle. (1983) , treat them as exogenous shocks and do not deal with how they arise.
-9-sector balance sheet, household real wealth, consumer sentiment, and short-and long-term interest rates.
This aspect of the financial factor can be seen to have been more pronounced this time than any other post-W.W.II downcycle. Outsized declines in stock and real estate prices, 52.6% and 27.4%, respectively, peak-to-trough, arguably price "bubbles" that burst after a huge boom in housing, housing prices and unsustainably high equity prices, took down real household wealth With the greatest percentage declines in residential real estate and stock market prices for any episode since the 1930s (Table 3) , the loss in funding to consumers from these two sources was massive and the impact greater than the effect of real disposable income, and accounted for a large portion of the unusually large declines in consumer spending that appeared in the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009.
-10- Figure 2 shows the DE Household Financial Conditions Index (high levels "bad" and low levels "good"), a summary measure and weighted average for a variety of indicators that define the financial condition of the household sector.
What rose. In such a situation, the burden of the household balance sheet relative to assets and incomes becomes quite large, the credit risk of the household sector rises, and the ability to obtain funds is compromised.
In Figure 3 is shown that the role of the consumer in this last downturn was pronounced, where the longest, and still in-process, shortfall of growth in consumer spending from historic trend since W.W.II has been occurring. Over only a two-quarter span, 2008:3 and 2008:4, but even longer before-and-after, aggregate consumption, in real terms and at annual rates, fell 3.5% and 3.1%, respectively. This was a major downward impulse not seen post-W.W.II that reverberated through the U.S. economy and to non-U.S. economies where a large proportion of exports was to American consumers. The downward impulse to trade, especially for countries like China, Japan and Germany, produced a negative shock to the world economy through the interactions of trade, and reductions of imports and exports around-the-world. This helped push the global economy into recession.
At over 71% of the U.S. economy at the time, the sharp declines in consumption spending were decisive, rippling-out to other sectors through multiplier-accelerator interactions and to the global economy through declines in exports for major export economies such as China, Japan Cashout refinancing is a relatively recent feature of the economy, innovated in the 1990s and first decade of the 21 st century, as were the huge realized capital gains that occurred from an outsized equity market boom (Figure 1 ). These sources of funds had a huge effect, both in the prior upturn and downturn, directly and as collateral for additional debt-financed spending.
These changes in a changing economy affected the depth and duration of the business cycle downturn, with the "financial factor" interacting with aggregate consumption as an essential ingredient. The financial factor, at least this aspect of it, shows up far more negative than for any other recession in the modern era and underscores the need to more fully integrate the financial factor into the conceptualization, measurement, and dating of the business cycle.
B. Goods or Services Economy?
Tables 4 to 6 show some striking changes in the structure of the U.S. economy post-W.W.II as between "goods" and "services," both from the supply-side, that is the U.S. labor market and the demand-side, that is consumption. Much of theoretical economic analysis is "goods" oriented and so is the measurement and dating of business cycles circa BM and now. 8 There seems to be no real theory of the services economy in macroeconomics.
The data in these Tables illustrate the shift over time in the U.S. economy, not shown for other economies but likely the case, toward "services" production and spending vs. "goods"
spending and output.
The changes in the economy as between goods and services is striking.
8 NBER (2003) This series appears to have led the last downturn in jobs and on recent data may be leading the next upturn.
Within the services sectors (Table 5 ) the growth in Education/Health Care jobs as a portion of the total has been very strong, as has Leisure/Hospitality and Professional/Business Services.
Health Care jobs now are 14.8% of nonfarm payroll. This was near 5% in the late 1950s.
-13-Leisure/Hospitality and Professional/Business Services jobs have almost doubled as a proportion of nonfarm payrolls compared with five decades ago.
From the demand-side, an illustration of the change between goods and services spending is the composition of aggregate consumption, shown over many decades in Tables 6 and 7 .
Here, it can be seen that the proportion of real GDP in the consumption of services has risen across business cycles and of goods declined. Services consumption was 46.9% of total real GDP in October 2009; 38.2% in 1954. Within consumption spending (Table 7) , which shows a breakdown of services expenditures in consumption, 67.5% of total consumption is in services compared with 43.5% in 1954. The Table also shows the growing size of Health Care spending, now 16.1% of total consumption and between 10% and 11% of real GDP. This is nearly triple the relative size of residential construction and near the share of exports in real GDP, not far below the share of business fixed investment in real GDP, and more than double the share of real GDP in federal government purchases.
The labor market and consumption data confirm that the U.S. is largely a "services"
economy. These data suggest that conceptualizing and measuring the business cycle as industrial, or manufacturing, is outdated and that using economic time-series that reflect the services side of the economy would be better.
For example, nonfarm payroll data, in the aggregate, could be misleading on the economy, but perhaps if disaggregated, or weighted, or calculated in another form, an index for example, might be more useful in depicting, measuring, and dating the business cycle. Some sort of weighting mechanism, reflecting the changing proportions of employment by category could be used to create another series that might do a better job in measuring the business cycle and its turning points.
Years ago, three months of declining industrial production almost certainly marked the onset of recession. Even now, industrial production is indicated as a coincident indicator with the -14-economy and utilized by the NBER to identify cycle turning points. Real GDP, even though quarterly, the series with the highest weight for marking a recession or expansion according to the NBER, probably has become less reliable in judging business cycle turning points. In recent business cycle episodes, the aggregate economy has continued to expand even after three-ormore months of declines for industrial production. The industrial production measure reflects the state of manufacturing in the U.S. economy rather than a more complete depiction of the overall economy and should no longer be used in the way that it has.
C. The Labor Market-A Structural Change?
The first "jobless" recovery occurred after the 1990-91 recession when nonfarm payroll jobs, previously typically coincident with economic activity, continued to decline for several months after the upturn began, and did not show any significant, sustained increases until about one year later. Previously, jobs generally had started to rise approximately at the turning point between
Recession and Recovery and were used to mark that turning point.
After the 2001 recession, however, a pattern similar to post-1990-91 occurred, but this time it was 12 months before nonfarm payroll jobs began to rise and over two years until the increases of jobs were significant, defined as sustained rises of 100,000-or-more. Currently, joblessness has continued despite a probable dating of recovery in September or
October 2009. At times, the NBER has dated the turning point of an upturn when nonfarm payroll jobs were still declining.
Of ten prior post-recession upturns, the median number of months after a turning point until nonfarm payroll jobs turned positive has been 2.3 and for significant rises in jobs (more than One possibility is that businesses have become reluctant to hire quickly after a turning point given how costly labor has become over the years, the now many alternatives to labor because of technology, ability to outsource outside a company and outside the U.S., and because of the uncertainty associated with recoveries such as the last two, which initially were very weak.
After the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions, deemed mild because of shallow downturns in real GDP, the first year of the upturn saw quite subdued real economic growth, just 2.6% and 1.9%, respectively. These compare with a median 6.8% rate of growth for real GDP in the first year after a recession. Doubt on the permanence of increases in sales and earnings could have led to cautious hiring, indeed continued firing to hold down expenses, maintain profits, and to maximize shareholder value.
Maximizing shareholder value is relatively new for business but in the U.S. has become its mantra, especially since 1990.
Seriously taken, it suggests heightened attention to keeping expenses down and growing revenues in a more pronounced way than historically. The biggest expense to firms is labor, allin now including wages, bonuses, social security, retirement pensions, and benefits such as -16-401k's and health care. The benefits portion of compensation has risen sharply, particularly for health care.
With weak real economic growth initially in the upturns and increasingly higher costs of labor, businesses have been incented to look for ways to produce output and gain sales other than by hiring labor.
Many alternatives exist, particularly through labor-saving technology, systems shifts, robotics, communications technology, reorganizations of organizations, cost-saving engineering, outsourcing, use of temp workers, the removal of layers of administration and productivity enhancements, all now more possible in a globalized setting. So, it should not be surprising that increased joblessness, in amount and time, has characterized each of the last two recoveries.
Maximizing shareholder value, or the stock price as it discounts future earnings and interest rates, involves keeping expenses down and revenues up. In the "modern" U.S. business cycle, companies pay more attention than ever to keeping expenses down in good times and bad. Given how costly labor is and the emphasis on maximizing shareholder value, continuing joblessness is to be expected.
Indeed, without changes in macroeconomic policies to stimulate U.S. economic growth to a much faster pace, specifically to reduce joblessness, or reductions in any, or all, elements of the cost-of-labor, another episode of joblessness could occur with the peak in the unemployment rate, whenever reached, sticky-high and millions of Americans unemployed, working less than desired, or having dropped-out that could produce the worst labor market since the 1930s.
D. Shifting Global Economic Geography
Few are fully aware of the seismic shift in global economic and financial market geography that has taken place in recent years, changing probably for decades the way in which the U.S.
economy interacts with the rest-of-the-world and how the economies, markets and policies of other countries affect the U.S. and potentially the business cycle.
-17-
The paradigm has been that the global economy is U.S. driven, a correct one for a long time, especially for the decades during which BM and the NBER have chronicled and dated business cycles. But this paradigm may no longer be so.
Although still a relatively small share of U.S. real GDP, certainly relative to consumption spending and generally business capital spending, exports and imports, that is, trade, and the current account deficit are becoming more-and-more important for the cyclical behavior of the U.S. economy.
The Asian Crisis of 1998-99 was an example of the effect of the rest-of-the-world economies. A collapse occurred in developing country economies, markets, exchange rates, and business and finance. This negative economic shock impacted U.S. financial markets and the economy through a worsening of trade as a transmission channel from the rest-of-the-world to the U.S.. But, the U.S. economy benefitted from the Asian Crisis shock through a flight of investment into the United States, improving U.S. financial markets and along with supportive monetary policies, a cushioning of any downturn that might have occurred.
In this most recent cycle episode, the financial factor and financial crisis in the U.S. reverberated through U.S. consumption into the exports of numerous non-U.S. countries, whose exports to the U.S. had been a significant proportion of their total and where intraregional trade flow propensities were high, taking down non-U.S. economies' real economic growth, intensifying the financial crisis, then the U.S. economic downturn, global economic downturn, back to the financial crisis, etc..
Was this a one-time event or did it represent fundamental changes in the U.S. and global economies that invite a rethinking and revisiting of the business cycle?
Tables 9-13 provide some insight into this question. (2007) for a discussion of the shifts in-process in the global economy and markets and potential implications for the business cycle.
-18- Table 9 shows a changing global economic geography for selected years since 1995, with For Europe and the U.K. collectively, designated generally as part of the G-7, the position globaregionally has fallen, replaced by a collection of countries deemed "Emerging" but now in momentum overtaking in importance the Eurozone, U.K., and U.S.. Those countries who export much to the United States now show much less exports with the U.S.
destination as a proportion of the total and a greater proportion of total exports intraregionally for countries closer in geographic location, or in similar economic activities. The exposure to the U.S. of these countries in terms of exports as a proportion of GDP generally is far less than it has been and in many situations strikingly so.
The upshot of the tendencies shown in Tables 10 and 11 should be more resilience to declines in U.S. economic activity than previously, depending on its source, particularly if other major countries do not suffer downturns at the same time.
To some extent, the aftermath of the economic and financial crises of the last U.S. downturn reflect this with Asia ex-Japan countries' economies reviving in a more "V"-like fashion than the U.S.. The U.S. has exited its downturn but only softly, more "L"-like with an uptilt for the bottom of the "L" rather than the more typical exit from recession of a "V."
In Table 12 For China, the long period of trade surpluses has led to a huge foreign exchange position, some $2.3 trillion, the highest in absolute terms and relative to GDP of any country in the global -20-economy. The U.S., on the other hand, has only about $120 billion in foreign exchange reserves, a tiny fraction of its GDP.
Countries with significantly positive current account surpluses and foreign exchange reserves include Japan ($160 billion), Germany ($132 billion), Norway ($60 billion), the Netherlands ($45 billion), Switzerland ($45 billion), Malaysia ($37.3 billion) and even Russia ($48.4 billion).
As a percentage of GDP, many countries' positions far exceed that of the United States. Foreign exchange reserves follow current account deficits or surpluses so that the countries with positive current account balances also show good-sized foreign exchange reserves, particularly in relation to GDP, e.g., Russia at near $500 billion in foreign exchange reserves and Japan over $1 trillion.
Similar observations can be made for country positions and government budget deficits and debt, in absolute terms and relative to GDP, not shown here. But the figures for these measures of country financial positions show that the U.S. is far up in the rankings of countries with deficits and gross debt-to-GDP now at over 10% and 70%, respectively, and headed for 100 percent plus in coming years under existing fiscal policy and economic prospects, while China and India, for example, have budget deficits relative to GDP only in relatively low single-digits.
Debt-to-GDP ratios in numerous so-called emerging countries are well below those in, and expected, for the United States. In the U.S., the share of exports and imports in real GDP is roughly 12%, significantly higher than in most previous years and reflecting the increased importance of the non-U.S. world economy in the U.S. business cycle.
Implications for understanding and depicting the U.S. business cycle are potentially numerous, not the least of which is the dynamics of trade flows under situations such as a decline -21-in non-U.S. economic activity, especially the larger economies, for the U.S. business cycle and the potential compensating effect on the U.S. real economy in a U.S. downturn where falling imports can help cushion real GDP.
In such a situation, essentially what happened in this last episode where U.S. consumption tumbled, taking down the exports of numerous other countries and non-U.S. real economic activity, reductions in U.S. imports as well as exports resulted, net, an offsetting pickup of real exports and real GDP against the declines registered in the U.S. private domestic economy. This is a general problem for business cycle measurement from this well-known average aggregate summary measure, along with its quarterly frequency, delays and revisions.
Real GDP, therefore, as a measure of the business cycle and a key indicator for cyclical turning points may be less informative on the extent of the downturn, its depth and duration since it averages real net exports into the real GDP aggregate along with consumption and business fixed investment.
E. Psychology and Expectations-Survey Measures and Anecdotal Evidence
In recent years, "behavioral economics" has become a significant area of research and application in economics. Psychology and expectations, normally assumed as given, are highlighted in this branch of study. In microeconomics, given preferences, or utility functions, based on "rational" choice theory, have formed the basis for much of microeconomic theory and its applications. In macroeconomics, particularly business cycles, and especially where financial markets and the financial factor interact with the real economy, a role for psychology and expectations seems quite plausible.
Expectations formation in macroeconomic dynamics has been present in cyclical analysis for many decades, particularly in the area of capital goods spending whether for inventories, business fixed investment, or consumer durables expenditures. Distributed lags in capital -22-spending motivated by stock-adjustment or derived from expectations in a dynamic setting characterize the real economy and, to some extent, financial market processes as well.
Expectations and psychology, reactions to risk, greed and fear, perceptions, and even delusions and mania have been described in relation to financial crises.
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Nowhere, perhaps, is the role of expectations as prominent as in financial markets and business cycles, especially cyclical movements around business cycle turning points.
This relatively unexplored area of business cycle analysis, especially given the real economy orientation of macroeconomics in the analytical models of business cycles and its characterization and measurement, perhaps offers much in the way of data to help measure the business cycle.
The swings in financial markets, such as those in the recent downturn reported in Table 3 defy full explanation on standard paradigms and models.
Since financial markets discount risk and react to perceptions, true or not, mixed with human behavior and emotion, considerable data-survey and anecdotal-that describe the "psychology"
and "expectations" of financial market participants and decisionmakers are worth examining for content that can help describe the business cycle and, in particular, turning points. -23-and investments, and through financial transmission mechanisms to the real economy, how could data on expectations, if available, be used in measuring and dating the business cycle?
Ample survey data exists in a number of areas relating to financial markets, the economy, and potential spending and borrowing behavior. Some of these data could well be relevant and synchronous with the business cycle as well as providing content for assessing turning points, both upper and lower. or whether a turning point is being approached, or reached, either for recession or for recovery.
Surveys designed for this purpose could be devised by statistical agencies, or others, and might reflect almost in real-time the views of economy participants as to the stage of the business cycle.
Although unconventional and perhaps nonrandom, forecasters have used anecdotal evidence for years along with statistical data and a conditioned understanding of business cycle phenomena to make judgments on the current state of the business cycle, not just to forecast the future.
Concluding Perspectives-Revisiting and Rethinking the Business Cycle
In the years since Burns and Mitchell (1946) did pioneering work on measuring the business cycle, has the economy changed so as to affect how we should conceptualize, measure, and date the U.S. business cycle? What is clear and what is not in the changes in a changing economy that might cause a rethinking and revisiting of the business cycle?
In this paper, the focus has been not so much on has the business cycle changed, but whether changes in the economy have occurred that suggest a rethinking and revisiting of the conceptualization, measurement, timing, and dating of the business cycle.
Given the role and prominence for matters financial in the business cycle, highlighted by the recent Expansion and Contraction, the economic time-series used to measure and date the business cycle should be reassessed. Most of the data measure real economy phenomena, not financial phenomena.
The financial services sector now comprises a larger part of the economy than in past decades and affects the economy in a cause-and-effect manner much more than previously. This has been underscored by the latest business cycle upturn and downturn, which was highly financial in the extent of the upswing and the long and deep downturn. Financial institutions and financial services are a significant part of the economy with market capitalization in the S&P500 Has the U.S. labor market fundamentally changed and, if so, is its use in measurement now diminished? Changes in the substitutability of equipment for labor, high cost of labor including benefits, global labor mobility, and the business mantra of maximizing shareholder value suggest less jobs creation in the upturn and more jobs destruction in the downturn. How should the labor market be measured and used in the dating and timing of the business cycle?
Another change relates to the increased globalization and interrelated nature of economies and financial markets where the economies of countries such as China are growing in relative importance (Table 9) , decoupling from the U.S. in numerous ways (Tables 10, 11) , and 12 Stock-Watson (1989) look at financial indicators in the context of leading indicator analysis.
-26-becoming a major source of global and U.S. economic growth. The global economic recovery in process now and in the U.S. may be due more to a revival in China and Asia than in the U.S. and North America. U.S. exports and imports comprise a larger share of real GDP than used to be the case. Data on these aggregates and their components, available on a relatively high frequency, could be used to examine the impact of trade and be a source of measurement.
Finally, the role of psychology and expectations must be noted. Here, there is ample anecdotal and survey data, both on the financial and real economies. Conceptualization of the business cycle should take account of the changes in a changing economy, recognize its financial and real economy dimensions by using existing data, or developing new data, perhaps integrating the processes and dynamics of sector subcycles with the data used in measurement, and use knowledge and the measurement of lags in various subcycles, such as those for consumer durables spending, inventories and credit, in depicting and measuring the business cycle.
Rather than measuring turning points with static data that may depict an economy of the past, a combination of high-frequency financial time-series with high-frequency real economy data 13 Eckstein (____) made this point, a significant one. Knowledge and use of survey data can help in analyzing the processes underlying business subcycles in the economy as well as in measuring the business cycle.
-27-weighted by a tracking of underlying cyclical processes might do better in measuring shifts in the direction of the economy.
Solutions for conceptualization, measurement and dating of the business cycle, however, are not really offered here, mainly the motivation and some justification for rethinking and revisiting the business cycle and its measurements in a changed economy. 1970 1972 1975 1977 1980 1982 1985 1987 1990 1992 1995 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 
Index Level
Source: Decision Economics, Inc. Constructed using a weighted average of eight household sector variables that characterize consumer financial conditions. Note: Higher levels indicate worse financial conditions. -1953-1954 41.9 
